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The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry:

RESPONDING TO THE MARKET
By
Ralph De Palma

INTRODUCTION:
The International Space Year, 1992, was an ephemeral
period that helped usher in a new exiting era in commer
cial space launch. This era will include further
globalization of the industry, with sharply broadened
international business relationships being established that
wouldn't have been possible a few short years earlier.
Greater cooperation is occurring among the nations of the
world conducting space research and exploration. Former
adversaries are now business partners. New technologies
and smaller systems hold the promise of the economical
proliferation of new commercial communications systems
that will change our lives.

terrestrial cellular tower is replaced by a system of low
earth orbit (LEO) satellites. One of the proposed private
systems requires 66 satellites for global coverage. There
are eight proposed systems pending FCC approval that
could require the launch of up to 250 satellites costing a
total of $7 billion. Not all are expected to be built and
operated but the successful systems will clearly impact
the marketplace for commercial launch services in ways
that can yet be imagined. Responding to this market will
require serious attention by U.S. launch service providers
and a new approach to launch site infrastructure and
regulatory procedures by government authorities.

The fall of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union have created dramatic changes and opportu
nities for the U.S. commercial launch service providers.
These challenges require equally bold responses. With the
signing and forthcoming ratification of the START II
Treaty, a reduction of the U.S. strategic defense space
launch requirements will occur accompanied with a shift
in space policy focus. Historic opportunities are now
possible to convert the over capacity of military capabili
ties to value added, high wage, high growth commercial
activities.

The U.S. invented the launch market for commercial
telecommunications satellites in the 1960's and domi
nated the industry for two decades. Today we face
increasing foreign competition in the launch industry as
well as in the more lucrative satellite manufacturing and
satellite services industries. The European consortium
Arianespace is clearly recognized as the commercial
launch industry leader with over 50% of the global
market. The $5 billion U.S. commercial space industry
has been the leading aerospace growth sector, despite the
U.S decline in commercial launch market share. It is a
significant factor in the face of the declining defense and
civil government aerospace markets in 1991,1992, and
similar projections through the remainder of the decade.
The Department of Commerce predicts commercial
growth at an annual rate of over 14% for the remainder of
the decade. Coupled with predicted flat growth in future
NASA budgeting, the commercial space market will
surpass NASA budget appropriations by the year 2000.
In addition serious advances in space telecommunications
projects and technologies described above, could move
the commercial growth projections even higher.

Coupled with these events is an emerging market for the
launch of small commercial satellites that is predicated on
the worldwide need for mobile communications services.
As the global economy has become more intermeshed the
need for modernized communication systems in develop
ing regions and newly independent regions has grown to
enormous proportions. Latin America is expected to
spend over $110 billion by 2000 modernizing telecommu
nications in the region. Development and trade activity is
very closely tied with the ability to communicate freely.
Terrestrial communications in developing nations are
expensive to initiate and install and even more expensive
to maintain and operate. The most cost effective way for
a region to join the modern telecommunications world is
via satellite systems. A new element in satellite commu
nications that should be available in the next 4-5 years is
mobile satellite cellular service. In this concept the
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The mainstay of the current commercial launch market
has been the medium class telecommunications satellite
that is positioned in a fixed geosynchronous earth orbit
(GEO) 2 degree slot 22,300 miles above the earth. The
satellites are usually manufactured over an 18-24 month
process can cost as much as $ 100 million, and are
expected to generate over $1 billion in revenue in a ten
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year life span. They can require as much as a $500
million investment in ground infrastructure to be fully
utilized. The average launch costs are between $50-60
million dollars. Insuring a satellite launch varies between
16-20% of overall satellite cost and it can take as long as
five years from planning to on-orbit operations of a single
satellite.
This is a mature well defined market with a limited
number of participants and a small number of very
expensive launch events annually. With the relatively
small number of funded medium class payloads (Depart
ment of Commerce estimates 12-16 annually) and the
expanding line-up of international launch services
available, it is today, without question, a buyers market
for commercial launch services. Commercial space
launch customers have more alternatives than ever to the
once dominant U.S. launch services.
The key element in the discussion of promoting the U.S.
commercial launch industry, is the need for change.
Change is mandatory in our approach to industry regula
tion and oversight, change is clearly needed in our
approach to planning and execution, change is required in
our long term vision for the U.S. commercial space
launch industry. The Clinton administration comes to the
industry table with a mandate to change the way govern
ment does business and to break the commercial space
policy grid-lock in Washington. The commercial space
launch industry is a potential test case to invoke new
economic theory, and reinvigorate a vital U.S. industrial
base, before we succeed in exporting another high wage,
high growth industry that the U.S. once lead.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
The September 11,1992 decision by the Bush administra
tion granting several U.S. manufacturers of satellites 5
export licenses to China for launch on the Long March
vehicle, was viewed by many industry experts both U.S.
and European as being motivated by political ramifica
tions rather than strategic trade issues. The State Depart
ment announced the decision without the normal consul
tation with other agencies such as the Department of
Transportation. DoT fears that a non-market economy
such as China could dilute an already thin marketplace
with a launch service that cannot be compared on an equal
basis with western launch services. A State Department
representative declared that the agreement would create
jobs and reduce the deficit balance of trade with China.
The effect on the balance of payments was only partially
correct. Three of the export licenses will be for nonChinese organizations to purchase the satellites, conse
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quently the trade impacts will be with those nations. The
overall effect however is a net loss of revenue for domes
tic launch service providers and that could reduce jobs
and weaken the industry. The signals sent to financial
interests could be interpreted as destabilizing and there
fore increase the risk assessments to the investment
capital markets, further weakening the launch service
industries ability to borrow.
Much discussion has taken place over the entrance into
the world launch services marketplace by both China and
Russia (CIS). There influence is feared by the U.S. and
European launch service providers alike. The arguments
put forward include suggestions that China and the CIS
will be dumping services on the open market that do not
fairly reflect costs because of their socialized political
structures. The U.S. and Europe should tread very lightly
in this area. Protectionist attitudes can easily influence
those organizations that are not currently operating in the
true private sector to begin with.
It is entirely correct to say that the Chinese have a
different system for determining me fair market value of
their launch services and this could be harmful to interna
tional competition based on fair market systems. It is
quite different however in the case of the CIS. The
former Soviet Union had an industrial production and
launch capability that at one time was capable of putting
over one hundred payloads into orbit per year. The U.S.
has been averaging a little over 20 orbital launches per
year from the Cape at near full capacity as determined by
the Air Force. During the first 48 hours after the invasion
of Kuwait the Soviets launched seven military payloads
into orbit. The explanation for this robustness is the
development of standardized cheap expendable launch
systems and relatively simple standardized spacecraft. By
complete accident the former Soviet technologies are very
commercially competitive by western standards, and the
near launch on demand capabilities, are the commercial
launch service providers Val Halla. The point is, their
robustness is not a function of investment in advanced
sophisticated space flight hardware and infrastructure as
much as an investment in simplified industrial engineer
ing processes that work quickly and efficiently and could
be termed very market oriented. The Russians were
recently allowed a one time exemption to compete for the
launch of an American made satellite owned by Inmarsat.
Their bid price was almost 40% lower ($35 million) than
the closest European or U.S. launcher (approximately $60
million). Space experts visiting the CIS recently com
mented, that because of their effective industrial engineer
ing approach to mass produce vehicles and provide swift
integration and launch, their bid price could indeed reflect
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the true costs of launch service that could be compared on
an equal basis with western market oriented organiza
tions.
The U.S. will be forced to respond to this segment of the
competitive environment The Russians have asked for
greater U.S. cooperation and help in marketing practically
everything that is not bolted down in their space program.
India has already indicated interest in Russian made
propulsion systems. The Japanese held talks of purchas
ing various Russian systems up to and including the MIR
space station. Russian Zenit boosters could pop up at a
number of potential sites including Kourou as strap-on
boosters for Ariane V. While the Europeans are denounc
ing the Russian entrance into the commercial launch
industry, they are moving along signing agreement after
agreement with the Russians regarding the use of the MIR
and manned spaceflight technology, and are even consid
ering Russian entrance into the European Space Agency.
The French and Russians have also recently conducted
joint hypersonic scramjet test (Nov. 17,1992), and signed
a long term hypersonic research agreement. The huge
U.S. lead in hypersonics technology we once held appears
to be dwindling rapidly. This is a critical 21st century
technology that the Russians offered to jointly research
with the U.S. first After the U.S. turned down the
opportunity they found new partners quickly. By ignor
ing or discounting the Russian overtures we have helped
create our new competition in this technology.
One unique response to the marketplace was a December
29,1992 announcement between Lockheed Corporation
and the Russian Khrunichev Enterprise that manufactures
among other things the Proton expendable launch vehicle.
Lockheed /Khrunichev International (LKI) will be a joint
venture that will permit Lockheed to market the Proton
launch vehicle and conduct payload integration at the
Baikonur launch site in Kazakhstan or Plesetsk in Russia.
This will provide Lockheed with access to the commercial
launch services market through a reliable launch system
with huge commercial potential.
The impact of LKI agreement is not as clearly negative as
some U.S. launch interests would like to believe. The
U.S. does not dominate the commercial launch industry
the Europeans do. It is not clear whose market share is
more vulnerable to the Proton. The U.S. manufactured
communications satellites will be sparingly allowed
export licenses for launch by Russia. The Proton could
actually be of greater threat to Arianespace dominance
than to the U.S. segment. The threat presented by the LKI
agreement to 10% or even 20% of the domestic launch
industry revenue stream does not out weigh the benefit to
U.S. / Russian trade, the potential for launch technology
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transfer improving the long term U.S. launch industry,
and the prevention of further domination of the market by
European interests. The Lockheed response to the
international market environment may be the most
appropriate from our current market position.
Rocket Systems Corporation of Japan has already entered
competition for commercial launches before the first
flight of their H-2 booster, bidding for an Inmarsat-3
satellite launch contract. Three H-2 test flights are
planned in 1993 and 1994, with the first commercial
payload expected to be launched by 1995. Rocket
Systems is lobbying the Japanese government to lift the
restrictions by local tuna fisherman that prevent more than
2 launch windows (in February and August), per year
from the Tanegashima launch site. Their launch site is
30.5 degrees north latitude on one of the southernmost
islands of Japan. The H-l rocket was licensed U.S. Delta
technology and by agreement could only be used for the
launching of indigenous National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) payloads essentially freezing Japan out
of the commercial launch industry. The H-2 is the first
completely Japanese booster and allows unrestricted
entrance into the commercial marketplace.
Here again we find Rocket Systems Corporation a
consortium of 77 Japanese industrial firms, banks, and
insurance companies lead by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
working cohesively with the Japanese space agency
NASDA similarly to the ESA-Arianespace relationship.
Rocket Systems will oversee production and marketing of
the H-2 after the initial flight tests are conducted, and will
also handle final testing, quality control, user
developmenUidvanced planning, and some launch site
operations earlier done by NASDA, very similar to the
ES A-Arianespace working relationships. The H-2 will
also be very similar in performance to the Ariane-4, but
currently has a much higher price tag of about $ 110
million per launch. Rocket Systems hopes to reduce
booster costs by gaining efficiencies from placing block
orders of boosters, again strikingly similar to
Arianespace.
According to industry processing teams contacted the
$330 million dollar H-2 facilities complete with Vehicle
Assembly Building and crawler at Tanegashima rival
those at Kourou or the U.S. for modern state of the art
processing of commercial payloads. Many commercial
analysts feel that this commitment by Japanese interests
coupled with their overwhelming international trade
experience could add considerable competition to an
already rabid marketplace. The Japanese response to the
market looms formidably on the commercial launch
industry horizon.
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WINNING STRATEGY

OLD THINKING:

In today's marketplace for U.S. launchers there appears to
be several structural and policy disadvantages that helps
create competitive weakness. Those disadvantages
include the obvious aging flight hardware technology and
support infrastructure, but they also include a regulatory
policy system that is in need of complete review and
restructure to accommodate the post-cold war realities of
the global marketplace. Addressing technology issues
without curing the industry regulatory problems will not
guarantee improvement in the U.S. competitive position.
Addressing the regulatory issues immediately, will
provide a significant competitive stimulus in the shortest
period of time for minimal costs. Combining both
approaches is a winning strategy.

The most serious U.S. jauncfr industry competitiveness
factor is "old thin^nfl"- Blue Ribbon panels have been
convened in the past several years to make recommenda
tions on the future of the U.S. space program including
the commercial launch industry. All have been headed by
well meaning individuals caught up in a system congested
with cold war based "old thinking". Issues and recom
mendations regarding commercial space that resulted
were listless. The best description of the effects of "old
thinking" is the graying of black and white issues, the
blurring of lines of authority, and the issuing of authority
without responsibility or accountability. No consensus is
established no sense of direction or definitive strategy
imparted and consequently the ideas and recommenda
tions become muddled and are largely ignored. Most
large, multi-year, multi-federal agency space technology
programs have taken on many of these characteristics.
They no longer appear to provide the Apollo style
enthusiasm and dedication. They attract a different
element, one that is more cynical and pragmatic and less
idealistic and energetic. The U.S. can no longer afford
more of this type of leadership in the commercial space
industry.

The U.S. commercial space regulatory system that has
evolved over a number of years and is encumbered with
safety, cost, and scheduling, requirements that have
served adequately the cold war era military and civilian
government launch segments but do not successfully
address the post-cold war commercial launch industry
competitiveness issues. Almost every discussion in the
recent past regarding the space launch industry has been
from a perspective that placed more significance on the
national security strategic interests control over launch
sites and launch capabilities, than on the development of
commercial markets. For the commercial launch industry
to proliferate a basic national policy priority shift must
occur.
Commercial space transportation must be considered a
basic regulated commercial industrial operation and
allowed to become a normalized transportation segment.
The demystification of the processes and problems
associated with transporting payloads from launch site to
orbit is the foremost challenge presenting the U.S.
industry. It is possible for national security to be main
tained and commercial industries to thrive coincidentally.
Airports and seaports have mastered these obstacles for
decades and it is now time for the space transportation
industry to overcome the same parochialisms that have
limited the growth of U.S. commercial launchers. Our
international competitors have successfully normalized
their launch services. The current regulatory environment
administered by the military no longer serves the nations
long range goals in space. To compete we must embrace
the changes required and move on. The post-cold war era
now allows new thinking and innovative solutions to old
regulatory issues. The glofraj market place for space
launch services i§ no place for governnnent agency turf
battles, protectionism, or isolationism.
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An example of "old thinking" is the recent "Spacelifter"
recommendation. Even if the decade long development
period could be somehow mitigated, this approach to
solving our technology problems no longer works. By
combining all the requirements of the government and
commercial industry into one core vehicle, it is doomed to
failure under the weight of its own requirements. Mixing
the requirements for manned and unmanned vehicles as
well as Defense and commercial contracting, will dilute
the benefit of any new technology gains.
The Air Force C5 heavy lift military aircraft, designed to
transport troops and armor with a high degree of operability from less developed airfields, has never been utilized
for commercial cargo operations. Commercial market
forces dictated the more reliable and less expensive and
simpler design of the Boeing 747F. Both aircraft have
specific roles and serve their respective markets well.
Mixing both requirements into one vehicle would have
resulted in an inefficient expensive design serving neither.

NEW THINKING:
Privatization and industrial commercialization is taking
root around the world in places were former military
dictatorships, juntas, and communist authoritarian states
once stood. The role these former governments have
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played in restricting the economic growth and debilitating
the advance of international trade in their regions is now
clear to their populations, and with few exceptions seems
very unlikely to return. The rest of the world seems to be
committed to developing global markets, regional trade
agreements, and generally competitive economic har
mony. One exception appears to be the approach to
governing and regulating the commercial space launch
industry in the United States. Today the Air Force seems
pitted against other federal agencies and is more con
cerned with protecting historical turf, than cooperating
with commercial and civilian organizations to regain U.S.
competitiveness in this marketplace.
When Europe developed the Ariane vehicle, it was
designed from the very beginning to accommodate
commercial payloads. A very important decision oc
curred in 1978 that was to determine the fate of me
European commercial launch industry. The Europeans
recognized the proper role for governments to play in
commercializing space launch technology. Basic technol
ogy research and design functions that require large
infrastructure and facilities which can serve other space
systems design, were determined to be the proper role for
the European Space Agency (ESA). In January of 1980
the member nations agreed to allow the Ariane booster to
be mass produced and marketed by the first private launch
service organization Arianespace. This decision is now
regarded as an epic crossroads in European and the global
space industry.
The Europeans determined that operating a fully func
tional space launch system was the role of the private
sector. Negotiating booster manufacturing, marketing,
financing, underwriting, and conducting the launches are
all handled by a relatively small cadre of specialists (just
over 200) with the speed and flexibility that only the
private sector can provide. Arianespace is a private
corporation created under French Napoleanic law that
allows Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) the
French Space Agency to be a partner along with 36
private European aerospace and electronics companies
and 13 major banks. Combining all these resources and
not becoming overwhelmed by bureaucracy is in itself
somewhat of a marvel. Arianespace is by no means
perfect, however their success in the marketplace is
difficult to dispute.

CUSTOMER ORIENTATION:
One of the subtle differences between the Arianespace
operation at Kourou and the the commercial launch
operations at the Cape is the level of attention paid to the
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customer requirements. In a commercial industry were
there is more than one buyer and seller the amount of
attention paid to a client or potential client is an important
part of the product or service marketed. Arianespace
appears to understand these factors better than the Air
Force at the Cape, because it is a private organization and
conducts business mainly with other private organiza
tions.
According to the commercial satellite owners and
processing teams contacted for this study, there is a high
degree of attention paid to requirements of the Range at
the Cape, with a minimal degree of attention paid to the
requirements of the commercial customer. The initial
review of a spacecraft to be launched from the Cape is
conducted by the Range beginning long before its final
assembly. The disposition of the Range requirements can
and usually does take from 4-8 months. If any addi
tional customer requirement occur in that time frame prior
to arrival at the Cape (they almost certainly do) they are
likely to receive even less of a priority than the initial
Range requirements. Processing teams and customers
consequently arrive at the Cape and spend a great deal of
expensive processing time chasing approvals for minor
changes and late requirements. According to the custom
ers contacted, commercial processing teams are treated as
something abnormal that happens to occur infrequently at
the Cape, as opposed to the normal government payload
customers. The entire process has been termed by all
former customers contacted as highly adversarial (a
search for problems) rather than participatory in its
approach.
When discussing certain campaigns or processing teams
with Arianespace their representatives are quick to name
key members of teams as respected professionals. The
Arianespace managers could discuss by name team
members and how much experience each had, how many
launch campaigns they have worked, and in some cases
organizational idiosyncrasies. A higher degree of
comradre appears to evolve in this process between the
processing teams, customers, and Arianespace. The small
size of Arianespace (approx. 200) and the low turnover
rate of launch site personnel may account for part this
phenomena. However it goes to a much deeper organiza
tional commitment to service. Several of the teams stated
that the U.S. companies provide launches and
Arianespace provides Launch service. The huge number
of people involved in the processing approval and launch
activities at the Cape and the constant turnover of key
military personnel does not allow this accumulated
customer knowledge base to occur. When discussing
satellite processing teams with A/F approval offices the
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conversation usually shifts to the launch service provider
teams as the best known and trusted personnel and the
payload customers and manufacturers are associated with
being outsiders.
To effectively respond to the market an attitudinal
adjustment in orders of magnitude is required, or a
complete shift to a civilian run customer oriented com
mercial launch industry at the launch sites. NASA had
earlier assumed the role of marketing commercial launch
services on the Space Shuttle in the early 80's. The
results were heavy subsidy, constant delays, and gross
inefficiency. The Challenger accident and subsequent
policy change removed NASA from the marketplace.
Currently the U.S. Air Force is not faring much better in
overseeing the commercial expendable vehicles. The Air
Force maintains the manifesting, controls access to
facilities, and generally disrupts the other market forces
which dictate to commercial payload owners when and
for how much a payload should be launched. With the
European approach those functions are only entrusted to
the customer oriented private launch authorities, and they
just happen to be the most successful commercial launch
organization in the world, Arianespace. This type of new
wave government industrial policy that defines the
government role in commercial space as purveyor of basic
technology research, is being applied in Japan, and even
the former Soviet Union. Soon to successfully compete,
the U.S. will be forced to alter its approach to regulating
the commercial space launch industry or be driven from
the marketplace.

U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE POLICY AT A
CROSSROADS:
The government is by far the largest single customer of
U.S. launch services and today only a fraction of those
services are procured commercially. With only one
customer dictating non-market, government procurement
oriented procedures and requirements, the impact is felt
by the smaller commercial market sector as well. By
responding to the needs of the government, U.S. launch
service providers have incurred built-in overhead that acts
as a deterrent to international competitiveness. The
unabridged documentation requirements, the
government's rigid inefficient procurement process, the
convoluted launch approval process, the layers of govern
ment authorities, and the general government works
program approach to the launch industry, have stacked the
deck against U.S. commercial launch service providers.
The Cape and other launch sites have over the years been
accustomed to large government programs covering
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multiple launches of medium and large payloads which
can last many years. Commercial customers with a single
medium payload to launch every so often, are foreign to
this cultural environment. The impact of commercial
space on the Cape operating environment to date has been
minimal. Payloads are approved, integrated, tested, and
launched with little regard to their pedigree. Medium
class commercial payloads in general have been assimi
lated into the existing launch operations infrastructure and
treated very similar to government payloads
Just over the horizon however are several commercial
projects now being planned that could provide the growth
opportunities and launch activity needed to stimulate a
new commercial marketplace. These new commercial
payloads will be smaller with improved miniaturized
technology and less expensive to manufacture, launch,
and operate. They pose minimal technological risks and
in most cases require little or no development time, can be
prepared and launched with a small very responsive team.
Lightsat or small satellite technology has been around for
a long time. The need for for small systems in the past
were generally for unique missions, or basic research, and
never generated the serious interest that would stimulate
the investment in small launch system infrastructure.

SMALL PAYLOAD LAUNCH
The emerging market for small satellites to conduct useful
research and provide commercially viable applications
appears to be coming to fruition. The widespread use of
small systems has not occurred until now because of the
success of the larger GEO commercial payloads, and the
reliance by the government systems on large long lead
time projects.
They are driven by the need for global commercial
communication services and not government procure
ments. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) communications
satellite constellations that have been proposed by eight
different organizations vary from constellations of 12 to
66 small satellites (under 2000 Ibs.) per system. The LEO
communications systems will provide cellular communi
cation with space based resources instead of ground based
antennae cells. The larger more expensive systems will
offer voice, data, and FAX. The smaller systems will
deliver data and FAX. Most will provide positioning and
location services, either independently or linked to the
Global Positioning System.
There is one common question that arises during every
discussion of the LEO 4s "Is the market real?" The
market for the LEO satellite communication systems is as
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real as the cellular market. The existing cellular industry
is one of todays fastest growing communications sectors
with over 100,000 cellular phones sold daily. The LEO
systems offer a dramatic extension and global expansion
of this marketplace. Mobile communications systems
have the potential to alter and stimulate the global
business culture, play an essential role in emergency
disaster relief, enhance the work of environmental
monitoring systems, and provide a stabilizing effect on
political environments. Recent articles have appeared in
the Wall Street Journal quoting financial analysts lend
credence to the market potential for these ventures. The
question now is not so much "is the market real", but how
much market is there, and which organizations will
actually make it.

market share. With thin profit margins the launch site
costs will have to be controlled a great deal more than
with medium class payloads.
Currently the Federal Communications Commission is
reviewing license applications. Several licensees expect
to be fully licensed by the summer of 1993. The com
bined total of these proposed systems could require as
many as 250 launches by the year 2000 with a price tag of
over $7 billion. Not all plans will come to fruition,
however the U.S. launch industry should be taking steps
now to reap the benefits of this growth sector.

IMPACT ON THE CURRENT LAUNCH
MARKET

The LEO satellite market
has the potential to
institute an entirely new
approach to commercial
launch service. Throw
SYSTEM
NO. OF
ORBITAL
ORGANIZATION
INfTIAL
PROJECTED
SATELLITES LOCATION
OPERATIONS
COSTS
weight muscle will be
replaced with efficiency,
IRIDfUM
Motorola
66
LEO
1998
$3.7 BILLION
flexibility, and operabilGLOBALSTAR
Lorat/Quafeomm
1997
48
LEO
$875 MILLION
ity. Today the infrastruc
ODYSSEY
TRW
MED. ORBnr
12
1997
$1.4 BILLION
ture at the Cape and other
facilities is barely
ELLIPSO
Ellipsat Corp.
ELIPTICAL
12
1996
$254 MILLION
compatible
with todays
ORBCOMM
Orbital Communications
24
LEO
1995
$255 MILLION
marketplace. The LEO
STARSYS
NACLS, me.
1995
24
LEO
$250 MILLION
systems will force a
AIRE8
Constellation Communications
1996
LEO
48
degree of operability that
$292 MILLION
cannot be met in terms of
VITASAT
VITA Corp.
LEO
PHASE t OPERATING
3
$10 MILLION
existing capabilities and
LEOSAT
Leo sat Corp.
1996
18
LEO
$100 MILLION
facilities. To date the
U.S. launch site operators
TOTALS
$7.136 BILLION
256
have not acknowledged
the requirements to
support the LEO launch
market. The magnitude
of this potential needs to
The LEO systems will require multiple launches for initial
be analyzed by the Department of Transportation. Long
operations. Integrating multiple satellites is not com
range planning and infrastructure funding needs to be
pletely foreign to the Cape but will require a much
determined and a plan of action committed to. Ground
different approach to test and checkout, safety approvals
support systems will be required to handle peak loads of
of multiple identical satellites, and scheduling of limited
launch activity during satellite initial activities and future
resources along side the current market for medium class
system upgrades. Today's GEO satellites are usually
GEO payloads. Low earth orbit payloads will have
replaced after there ten year life span with a larger
limited life spans of 4-5 years as opposed to 10 for GEO
capacity spacecraft. Station keeping, guidance and
satellites. Satellite replacement, upgrading, and logistical
control technology, and routine functions have changed
flights will require a near launch on demand capability.
very little over the development cycles. The LEO
The new systems will be highly competitive, therefore
systems will be smaller more numerous and flexible.
reliability and maintainability will be key to providing
Technology obsolescence driving system upgrades will be
quality customer cellular and data services and capturing

LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
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a constant issue with the service providers looking to
maintain a competitive edge.
The commercial launch market will be drastically affected
by smaller spacecraft with more launch frequency. There
will be new opportunities for federal, state, and industry
relationships based on mutual benefit from a growing
dynamic space launch segment. New approaches will
need to be tested including technical and non-technical.
Space launch insurance for multiple satellite systems will
present different risk analysis issues for underwriters.
The larger number of events should help benefit both
spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturers with im
proved industrial engineering practices and efficiencies of
scale. Producing satellites in groups of 48 instead of
individual custom orders, will create a production system
that can drive similar improvements in launch vehicles
and ground support equipment.
The LEO industry competitiveness will force a new
criteria for launch response times. Having single or
multiple failures in an operating communications constel
lation, can affect the revenue stream but even more
importantly can allow ones competitors a significant
marketing advantage. Reliability and dependability is
evident in todays competition in the long distance
telecommunications markets. Sprint, MCI, and AT&T
are all competing on service more than any other factor.
For the LEO systems to provide quality reliable service, a
logistical support system that includes on orbit spares,
rapid response launch vehicles, and flexible launch
scheduling is essential. These factors are all desirable
today but will be almost required to support the LEO
market. The launch site infrastructures and procedures
will need to considerable change to achieve these goals.
Smaller systems are much more vulnerable to the effects
of fluctuating launch costs. A new approach will be
necessary by the launch site in defining expenses and
holding the line for identical launch processes. Commer
cial operators can reduce substantial business risk with
reliable predictable costs. The Cape and other U.S. sites
will have to minimize and control launch costs and
stabilize the overall environment to insure the LEO
system organizations of reliable business planning data
long before the satellites reach the launch site.

SMALL PAYLOAD MARKET POTENTIAL
The small satellite market has enormous potential for
applications other than communications and navigation.
Remote sensing systems now rely on medium and large
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satellites that take an average development time of 4-5
years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The only
investors to date have been governments and only a few
systems are in continual use. The U.S. Commerce
department has sited remote sensing as a potential growth
segment of the commercial space industry if certain issues
can be addressed. The volatility and value of commer
cially useable data from remote sensing satellites is now
limited because the satellites in polar orbit overfly a
particular region only once every 14 days. Studies have
shown the commercial usefulness of the data increases
with the increased frequency for comparison. Constella
tions of smaller satellites over flying the same regions
daily, the data can become more useful information
regarding agriculture and resource management. One
proposal by Dr. Edward Teller is based on the military
Brilliant Eyes program. The system would consist of 48
low earth orbiting satellites constantly observing the
entire globe. Technology for detecting military launches
can be directly applied to detecting impending crop
failures. The Indian Space Research Organization has
lead the field for many years in the development of cost
effective small remote sensing technology mat can serve
regional environmental monitoring, water and resource
development, and sustainable agriculture. They will
obviously participate in the future development of these
technologies. NASA's once huge Earth Observation
System platforms have been broken up into smaller
segments, though still not considered lightsats, every
indication is the trend is for even smaller EOS platforms.
The University of Surrey, U.K., the Norwegian Space
Center of Oslo, and Arianespace have all conducted
recent studies analyzing the markets for small satellites.
The results point towards a growing market for small
payloads that will change the complexion of the launch
industry in the next 2-3 years. Small entrepreneurial
launch vehicle builders who struggled to remain afloat
during the past decade are increasingly optimistic about
the 90's. Names like American Rocket Co., Orbital
Sciences Corp., EER Systems, Microspace International,
Bristol Aerospace, are expecting a share of the estimated
12-24 launches annually by 1999. The future market
potential based on current demand does not take in
consideration the potential for advances in data process
ing and sensor fusion applications or a growing demand
in a newly invigorated post-cold war world. Traditional
names in aerospace such as Motorola, TRW, Loral,
Lockheed, Fairchild, and others are entering the small
satellite market with multi-million dollar investments
adding tremendous credibility to the segment. The United
Nations authority is growing as is the interest in providing
the benefits of space technology to the developing nations
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of the world. The 1992 "Rio" Earth Summit amplified
the need for high tech agriculture, resource management,
and environmental monitoring on a more global scale.
The environmental industry is targeted by many as they
next major growth industry.

RESPONDING TO THE MARKET
The next major market for launch services is now
emerging. Small satellite systems that reduce technology
risks, development time, and up front investments are
destined to play a significant role in future space launch
activities. The U.S. launch industry is now at one of those
crossroads that occur so few times in a human life span.
Strategic business alliances are now being formed across
the globe that will have implications affecting the
commercial launch market for decades. The U.S. launch
industry infrastructure and policy is not prepared for this
event and may be overwhelmed if actions are not forth
coming. The launch industry and regulators need to
consider a blank sheet of paper approach to stimulating
the market for LEO satellite systems and other small
payload launch. These systems will have heavy front end
costs and razor thin profit margins as compared to the
current medium sized payloads, the effect of delays and
cumbersome range requirements could force the market to
develop elsewhere.
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The U.S. government and industry has a limited window
of opportunity presenting itself in the case of the LEO
systems and small launch market in general. The next 3-6
months will see the approval and licensing process take
place along with strategic financial relationships estab
lished to promote these systems. If U.S. launchers and
launch sites do not actively pursue this new market
segment, others will. By inaction or inappropriate action
we will help create the next generation of competitors for
U.S. launch service providers and in all probability seal
the fate of the U.S. commercial launch industry. A
strategic effort needs to be initiated by commercial
agencies now, to lead an organized comprehensive
response to this emerging market before the U.S. finds
itself reacting again to the vision of others.

Ralph De Palma is a commercial space consultant with 22
years of aerospace experience, and is based at the Cape.
His experience includes commercial launch operations
and international marketing of space technologies. His
current activities are focused on the impact of the LEO
satellite systems on the Cape launch facilities and the
international markets for LEO communications services.

